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Risk, uncertainty and the Draft Basin Plan 
For much of the 20th century, the expansion of irrigated agriculture in the Murray Darling 
Basin, was treated as a self-evidently desirable objective, to be pursued without excessive 
regard to questions of economic costs and benefits. Irrigation seemed to offer a 
‘droughtproofing’ solution to the risks and uncertainties that plague dryland agriculture in 
Australia. 
By the late 1980s, however, the capacity of the Basin to support additional diversions was 
close to exhaustion. Analysis at the time suggested, in the terminology of Randall (1981) 
that a move from an ‘expansion’ phase in which resource constraints were relatively 
unimportant, to a ‘mature’ phase, characterised by increasingly sharp conflicts over access 
to the resource, was underway. It was hoped that these conflicts could be resolved at low 
cost through the introduction of market mechanisms. 
In reality, however, as noted by Quiggin (2008), the actual outcome was a ‘crisis’ phase, in 
which the possibility of a systemic collapse loomed ever larger. The only feasible response, 
it has become evident, is a ‘contraction’ phase, in which claims to the resource are scaled 
back.  
Attempts to deal with the problems of the Basin through the creation of markets in water 
rights, minimising the role of governments, began with the communique of the 1994 
Council of Australian Governments meeting and was developed more fully in the National 
Water Inititiative announced in 2004 (Council of Australian Governments 1994, 2004). 
The NWI was described by the National Water Commission as ‘Australia's enduring 
blueprint for water reform’, through which ‘governments across Australia have agreed on 
actions to achieve a more cohesive national approach to the way Australia manages, 
measures, plans for, prices, and trades water.’ 
In practice, however, the NWI failed to resolve many of the key conflicts associated with 
the mature water economy. Come conflicts between states arose from the need to deal with 
different systems of water entitlements. Conflicts also emerged between states and within 
the Commonwealth over the extent to which trade in water entitlements should (or should 
not be restricted) and over the possibility of transfers of water from rural to urban use.  
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Most importantly, the NWI did little to resolve the conflict between demands for extractive 
water use and the needs of the natural environment. 
However, only three years after the announcement of the Initiative, based on co-operation 
between Commonwealth and state governments, Prime Minister John Howard unilaterally 
announcing the National Plan for Water Security (Howard 2007). Although the National 
Plan was described as ‘accelerating the implementation of the NWI’ it amounted to an 
abandonment of the co-operative approach in favour of a Commonwealth takeover of water 
planning throughout the Murray-Darling Basin. The Plan was a poll-driven exercise 
produced largely by Howard himself. 
The central element of Howard’s plan was the Water Act 2007, which called for the newly 
created Murray Darling Basin Authority to prepare a management plan for the Basin, based 
on scientifically determined sustainable diversion limits for each catchment. The hope was 
that this plan would end the uncertainty surrounding water allocations and water rights, and 
thereby lead to a resolution of the long-running disputes over water use in the Basin. The 
Guide to the Draft Basin Plan (hereafter, the Guide) was released by the Murray Darling 
Basin Authority in October 2010. However, far from producing a resolution, the Guide was 
a source of new conflict. 
In this chapter, it is argued that many of the most intractable management problems of the 
Basin may be understood in terms of the interaction between uncertainty and property 
rights. 
Uncertainty and property rights 
As Adamson, Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2009) observe1, variability and uncertainty 
regarding natural flows is central to the analysis of irrigated agriculture. It is useful to 
distinguish between predictable variation (for example, seasonal patterns) and uncertainty, 
and to further distinguish two kinds of uncertainty: risk and ambiguity. Risk arises when 
the  probability  distribution  of  a  given  variable  is  known.  Ambiguity,  also  sometimes 
referred  to  as  Knightian  uncertainty  (Ellsberg  1961;  Knight  1921),  arises  when 
                                                
1 This section is based on the discussion in that paper  
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probabilities are unknown, or when it is not possible to describe all possible outcomes in 
advance. 
Even under stable long term climatic conditions, the probability distribution of inflows to 
the  Murray–Darling  Basin  displays  high  levels  of  risk  compared  to  other  major  river 
systems.  Farmers  and  other  water  users  do  not  respond  passively  to  risk,  but  choose 
production strategies to manage risk. To represent this appropriately, it is necessary to 
analyse production under uncertainty in state-contingent terms. A general theory of state-
contingent production is developed by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) and applied to the 
modelling  of  the  Murray–Darling  Basin  by  Adamson,  Mallawaarachchi  and  Quiggin 
(2007).  
Climate change has introduced ambiguity arising from the fact that our understanding of 
changes in climatic patterns remains limited, particularly at regional and catchment levels. 
Thus, while we know that the probability distribution of climatic variables will change 
from the historically observed values, we cannot yet determine the probability distribution 
that will be applicable in the future. When concern about the sustainability of irrigation 
policy in Australia first emerged in the 1980s, the possibility of climate change was not 
seriously considered in this or other discussions of public policy. Even as late as 1994, the 
water reform program agreed by the Council of Australian Governments (1994) took little 
account of climate change. 
This is a classic case of ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961). More fundamentally, the example of 
climate change shows that cannot consider all the possible states of nature that might affect 
the  outcomes  of  policy  decisions  or  production  choices.  This  problem  of  ‘unknown 
unknowns’, made famous by Rumsfeld (2002), has been discussed in detail by Grant and 
Quiggin (2010). 
Property rights under uncertainty 
Any property right may considered as a bundle of state-contingent claims. In some cases, 
such as those of property rights over consumption goods, the element of contingency is 
relatively unimportant, while in others, such as the rights associated with the purchase of an 
insurance policy they are critical. Rights to water for irrigation in Australia are in the latter  
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category. Different entitlements covering the same volume of water may involve radically 
different state-contingent allocations. 
In  theoretical  discussions  of  property  rights,  it  is  commonly  assumed  that  a  right  is 
specified so that, for every relevant contingency, the right is associated with a given claim. 
This assumption fits naturally with standard assumptions of unbounded rationality and zero 
transactions costs. As shown  by the  first and second  fundamental theorems of  welfare 
economics, any Pareto-optimal outcome can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium 
based on an appropriately chosen  
In  reality,  this  can  never  happen,  because  it  is  impossible  to  identify,  in  advance,  all 
possible states of nature. As is shown by Grant and Quiggin (2010), a decisionmaker who 
proceeds as if all possible states of nature have been considered is vulnerable to adverse 
surprises and to manipulation by more aware participants in the policy process. Moreover, 
even if participants in the policy process seek to agree on a set of responses to particular 
contingencies,  disagreement  will  inevitably  arise  ex  post  as  to  whether  the  necessary 
conditions have been fulfilled. This issue is discussed by Grant, Kline and Quiggin (2009). 
Exceptional circumstances 
One example, relevant in the current context is that of ‘exceptional circumstances’ under 
drought  policy.  The  criteria  adopted  in  1999  stated  that  exceptional  circumstances 
assistance should be available only in the event of ‘rare and severe events’ where a rare 
event  is  defined  as  one  that  occurs  on  average  only  once  in  every  20  to  25  years 
(Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Australia 2011).  
However, the severe drought conditions that prevailed in much of Australia in the decade 
following the adoption of the criteria resulted in exceptional circumstances assistance being 
made  widely  available,  often  for  periods  of  several  years.  Various  responses  to  this 
outcome are possible.  
One view is that the drought conditions of the early 2000s were indeed exceptional, and 
that the drought policy worked broadly as intended. Doubtless, those who formulated the 
policy would have hoped that the first occurrence of exceptional circumstances would not 
have been so early or so widespread, but the nature of uncertainty is that extreme events 
occur with positive probability.  
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A second view is that, as a result of climate change, droughts are likely to be more frequent 
and severe in future. On this view, it might be argued that it is necessary to recalibrate the 
definition of exceptional circumstances to the ‘new normal’. 
 A third view is that much of the exceptional circumstances assistance provided during the 
drought was not in fact justified under the stated criteria. On this view, the widespread 
provision of exceptional circumstances assistance represented a breakdown of the central 
theme  of drought policy, namely  that farmers should normally be  expected to manage 
climatic variation. 
The incomplete specification of terms like ‘exceptional circumstances’ has proved critical 
in drought policy, and has substantially affected policy responses to drought in the Basin. 
Even more significant, for the purposes of the Basin Plan, is the question of whether a new 
determination  about  the  sustainable  volume  of  extractions  from  a  given  catchment 
represents new knowledge or a change in policy. This issue, discussed in detail below is 
central to the way in which the risk sharing principles of the National Water Initiative are 
applied. 
The National Water Initiative and the assignment of risk 
The trading system set up under the 1994 water reform process provided irrigators with a 
range of tools for managing farm-level risks arising from uncertain water supply, as well as 
a marketable asset that could be used to manage financial risk. Thus, in periods of water 
shortage,  farmers  facing  cash  flow  problems  could  sell  water  entitlements  (either 
temporarily or permanently) to those with a high demand for reliable water supplies. 
However, by converting revocable licenses into property rights, the process reduced the 
capacity of governments and system managers to deal with aggregate uncertainty. 
The National Water Initiative (COAG 2004) set out principles regarding the sharing of risk 
arising from changes in the aggregate availability of water.  
Two  major  principles  were  announced.  The  first  was  that,  in  future,  water  allocations 
should  be  stated  as  shares  of  available  water,  rather  than  as  specific  volumes.  This 
approach deals with fluctuations in water availability by sharing the total amount available 
among users in proportion to their share. It raises the question of whether it will continue to  
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be possible, as at present, to distinguish between high-security and low-security rights. The 
difficulties with this approach are discussed by Freebairn and Quiggin (2006).   
The second principle, and one particularly pertinent in the present context, concerned an 
approach to the sharing of risk arising from changes in the aggregate availability of water. 
Under this principle, the risk of changes in water availability due to new knowledge about 
the hydrological capacity of the system will be borne by users. The risk of reduction in 
water availability arising from changes in public policy, such as changes in environmental 
policy, will be borne by the public, and water users will receive compensation for such 
reductions. 
The  principles  of  the  National  Water  Initiative  were  elaborated  in  more  detail  in  a 
statement  issued  by  the  2004  COAG  meeting  (Council  of  Australian  Governments 
2004).The Communique specified a framework that assigns the risk of future reductions in 
water availability as follows: 
  •  reductions arising from natural events such as climate change, drought or bushfire 
to be borne by water users; 
  •  reductions  arising  from  bona  fide  improvements  in  knowledge  about  water 
systems’ capacity to sustain particular extraction levels to be borne by water users up to 
2014. After 2014, water users to bear this risk for the first three per cent reduction in water 
allocation, the relevant State or Territory government and the Australian government would 
share (one-third and two-third shares respectively) the risk of reductions of between three 
per  cent  and  six  per  cent;  State/Territory  and  the  Australian  government  would  share 
equally the risk of reductions above six per cent; 
  • reductions arising from changes in government policy not previously provided for 
would be borne by governments; and 
  •  where  there  is  voluntary  agreement  between  relevant  State  or  Territory 
governments and key stakeholders, a different risk assignment model to the above may be 
implemented.   
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Risk and the environment 
The  National  Water  Initiative  principles  contained  a  crucial  ambiguity  regarding  the 
allocation  of water to the environment. At the time the NWI adopted, it was clear, in 
general terms, that the existing allocations of water for irrigation use were environmentally 
unsustainable. On the other hand, there had been no detailed assessment of environmentally 
sustainable levels of water extraction for the catchments in the Basin. Governments were 
committed to undertaking such an assessment, a commitment which was formalised by the 
Water Act 2007. 
The outcome of the assessments, not surprisingly, was that sustainable diversion limits in 
all catchments of the Basin should be set below the current Cap. The key question, in terms 
of the NWI was whether these assessments represented new scientific knowledge or were 
simply  a  consequence  of  a  change  in  policy  to  require  diversions  to  be  restricted  to 
environmentally sustainable levels.  
On  the  first  interpretation,  water  users  were  to  bear  the  costs  of  reductions.  This 
interpretation appears consistent with the NWI principles, noting in particular the reference 
to  ‘bona  fide  improvements  in  knowledge  about  water  systems’  capacity  to  sustain 
particular extraction levels’.  
On the second interpretation, the cost was to be borne by governments. It could be argued 
that  over-allocation  of  water  rights,  or,  at  least,  reckless  disregard  of  sustainability 
constraints, was conscious public policy in the decades leading up to the imposition of the 
Cap in 2004, and that the Cap froze existing over-allocation in place. On this view, any 
move towards sustainability would constitute a change in policy, and therefore the costs of 
any reduction in aggregate diversions should be borne by government. It is hard to see, on 
this reasoning, why principles of risk allocation were needed at all. 
Nevertheless, in the years following the adoption of the NWI, it became apparent that any 
attempt to  make irrigators bear the risk  associated with  the  determination  of limits on 
sustainable  levels  of  extractive  water  use  would  be  untenable.  A  number  of  factors 
contributed to this outcome. 
First, the severe drought conditions that prevailed for most of the first decade of the 21st 
century left large numbers of farmers in severe financial difficulty. An uncompensated  
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reduction in their water entitlements would have forced many to leave agriculture. This was 
unlikely to be a politically acceptable outcome. 
Second,  it  became  apparent  that  any  reduction  in  water  entitlements  would  entail 
substantial political difficulties. Even voluntary transfers of entitlements between irrigators 
faced substantial opposition. The Victorian government, in particular, imposed limits on 
the volume of entitlements that could be sold from a given irrigation district. 
Finally, the adoption and success of the  Restoring the Balance in the Murray-Darling 
Basin (Wong 2008) by the Rudd Labor government demonstrated that purchase of water 
rights from willing sellers provided a fiscally affordable method of securing large volumes 
of water for environmental flows. As at 31 December 2009 the Restoring the Balance 
program had secured the purchase of 766 gigalitres of water entitlements worth over $1.2 
billion (Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts 2010).  
Risk and the Guide to the Draft Basin Plan 
The Guide was released by the Murray Darling Basin Authority in October 2010. The 
release  of  the  Guide  was  an  opportunity  to  reach  a  broad  agreement  on  a  sustainable 
allocation of water rights, taking account of all the prevailing uncertainties.  
These hopes have so far not been fulfilled. Rather, the Guide has met with a strong, and 
largely hostile reaction. The document was publicly burned at meetings of farmers. The 
chairman of the authority, Mike Taylor resigned and has been replaced by a former 
minister in the NSW Labor government, presumably more attuned to the political realities. 
In large measure the failure of the Guide was due to poor communications. The Guide 
represented,  in  effect,  an  abandonment  of  the  principles  of  risk  sharing  set  out  in  the 
National Water Initiative, and a massive transfer of wealth to irrigators. The failure of 
communicate this fact was reflected in the hostile response of those who stood to benefit 
most from the policies put forward in the Guide. 
The key proposal is that the entire reduction in diversions proposed in the Plan should be 
treated as arising from a change in government policy. This proposal appears inconsistent 
with the risk principles. Proposals for reduced diversions were based on new scientific 
evidence  about  the  sustainable supply  capacity  of  the  different  catchments,  the  risk  of  
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which was supposed to be borne by irrigators. 
It could, perhaps, be argued that the unsustainability of existing policies was known at the 
time the NWI was agreed, and arguably since the imposition of the Cap in the early 1990s. 
On this view, the requirement to achieve sustainable diversion limits was itself a change in 
policy and that the associated risk should be borne by governments. However, given such a 
view, it seems hard to conceive of any risk that would be borne by irrigators, and therefore 
hard to understand the rationale for the elaborate principles of the NWI. 
A more plausible view is that the proposals in the Guide reflect political realities that have 
changed  substantially  since  2004.  On  the  one  hand,  the  political  feasibility  of 
uncompensated cuts in allocations, always limited, now appears non-existent. On the other 
hand,  the  2007  National  Action  Plan  for  Water  provided  (or  at  least  promised)  a 
Commonwealth  ‘bucket  of  money’  totalling  $10  billion  which  should  be  more  than 
sufficient to cover the cost of a reduction in diversions of 3-4000 GL. 
Risk and climate change 
The most important unresolved uncertainty in estimates of the capacity of the Basin to 
sustain diversions for human use relates to climate change. The estimates of Sustainable 
Diversion Limits used in the Guide were based primarily on historical observations over 
the period of 114 years since monitoring of the system began. On the assumption of a 
stable climate, a data set of this length would permit reasonably accurate estimates of the 
distribution of inflows. 
However, climate is changing as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, superimposed on 
natural cycles such as the Indian Ocean Dipole and El Niño Southern Oscillation. The 
Guide (vol 2, 4.2) discusses the problems of adjusting the plan to take account of the 
uncertain impacts of climate change. The solution adopted, which seems reasonable in the 
circumstances  is  to  defer  long-term  changes  until  the  next  ten-year  plan,  due  to  be 
developed around 2020. For the next ten years, the Guide imposes a 3 per cent reduction in 
entitlements relative to those that would be derived on the basis of historical data. This, it 
may be noted, is the only policy in the Guide that could accurately be described as a ‘cut’.  
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The Guide (vol 2, Sec 5.2) maintains the NWI approach under which the risk of climate 
change is borne primarily by water users. It remains to be seen whether this allocation will 
prove politically feasible. 
Balancing priorities 
The debate over the Draft Basin Plan, already confused and confusing was derailed still 
further by arguments over whether, and how, social and economic considerations should be 
balanced against the needs of the environment. These arguments had their genesis in the 
decision of the Howard government to pass the Water Act 2007 over the objections of state 
governments, which necessitated reliance on the Commonwealth’s treaty-based power to 
protect Ramsar-listed wetlands. As a result, the MDBA made public statements to the that 
it was required to give primary priority to environmental protection. 
These statements were inconsistent with the central policy decision of the Guide, namely 
that the volume of water to be restored to the environment should be between 3000 and 
4000  GL.  3000GL  was  estimated  to  be  the  minimum  consistent  with  environmental 
sustainability, while 4000 GL was estimated to be the maximum that would not entail 
unacceptable economic impacts.   
Obviously, the treatment of environmental and social/economic objectives in the Guide 
was symmetrical, with each being treated as a binding constraint. Given this symmetry, the 
insistence of the MDBA, and its chairman Mike Taylor, on the claim that environmental 
requirements had priority under the Water Act is difficult to understand.  
On-farm water saving 
The main remaining problem is that the great bulk of NWAP funding has been notionally 
allocated to finance on-farm water-saving measures. It seems highly unlikely, based on the 
experience  of  such  ventures  as  the  Food  Bowl  Modernization  Project,  that  there  exist 
sufficient cost-effective on-farm options to generate the proposed savings. Quiggin (2011) 
examines  the  Food  Bowl  modernization  project  and  concludes  that  the  cost  of  water 
released to Melbourne and the environment could be as much as $10 000/ML, five to ten 
times, the likely market price.  
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It seems likely that the infrastructure investments proposed under the National Plan for 
Water Security will replicate this disastrous outcome on an even larger scale. Given a 
willingness to purchase water rights at a market price, there is, quite simply no need to 
provide infrastructure subsidies. If infrastructure investments can realise cost-effective 
reductions in water losses, the water saved as a result can be sold at the market price, either 
for environmental or irrigation use, to pay for the investment. 
In equity terms, proposals to subsidise investment in irrigation infrastructure make little 
sense. As noted above, under a policy of repurchasing rights from willing sellers, irrigators 
are virtually guaranteed to be gainers. Their water assets increase in value, and, if they 
choose not to sell, the value of farm output is likely to increase as a result of the withdrawal 
of other irrigators. 
Assuming  that  the  Commonwealth  is  willing  to  bear  the  full  cost  of  reductions  in 
diversions, contrary to the risk allocation principles in NWI, it will be necessary to reorient 
some funding from NWAP/WFF. The central principle should be that of cost-effectiveness. 
Water-saving projects should be funded only if they can deliver savings at a lower cost 
than the market price of repurchase of water rights. 
A crucial requirement for progress is to minimize the dissipation of scarce public funds on 
cost-ineffective infrastructure investments. Such funds could be better allocated either to 
the purchase of entitlements from willing sellers or to social infrastructure.  
The way forward 
Given sufficient political will, and more skilful communications, it may still be possible to 
salvage a sustainable policy from the wreckage of the Guide. At this stage, the optimal 
political  strategy  is  probably  to  defer any  final  plan  while  proceeding  with  an  interim 
strategy that is, in essence a continuation of the voluntary purchase strategy of Water for 
the Future, with additional funding to ensure that purchase programs have a positive net 
economic and social effect on the communities concerned. Both the setting of specific 
targets for reductions in diversions and the funding of substantial investments in irrigation 
infrastructure should be deferred until the finalization of the Basin Plan. 
Using this incremental strategy, it should be possible to restore substantial volumes of 
water to the environment at relatively low cost, while addressing many of the adjustment  
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concerns  that  have  effectively  derailed  the  Guide.  A  reconsideration  of  sustainable 
diversion limits, taking account of environmental, economic and social objectives could 
then be conducted. 
Such a reconsideration must allow sufficient flexibility to respond to new information and 
unforeseen contingencies, as well as to the seasonal and annual fluctuations in inflows that 
have always characterized the Basin. The ultimate solution must be a system of property 
rights, specified in terms of state-contingent allocations to water users and the environment, 
along with a continued role for government as the ultimate risk manager. 
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